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  • Brutus I

     |  Rethinking Union and Government

    Essay I Essay I 1 Brutus Supporters of the Constitution dubbed their opponents "Anti-Federalists." Opponents resented the label, but it stuck. The Anti-Federalist author Brutus—most likely New York lawyer Robert Yates—penned this essay, the first of sixteen, a month after the Constitution was completed. Having attended the first month of the Constitutional Convention, Yates had left, disgusted with what he perceived as a plan that would give far too much power to the central government. October 18, 1787 To the Citizens of the State of New-York: When the public is called to investigate and decide upon a question in which not only the present members of the community are deeply interested, but upon which the happiness and misery of generations ...

  • Brutus XI

     |  Three Branches of Government

    Essay XI Essay XI 1 Brutus Here Brutus criticizes the power granted by the Constitution to an independent judiciary. January 31, 1788 The nature and extent of the judicial power of the United States, proposed to be granted by this constitution, claims our particular attention. Much has been said and written upon the subject of this new system on both sides, but I have not met with any writer, who has discussed the judicial powers with any degree of accuracy. And yet it is obvious, that we can form but very imperfect ideas of the manner in which this government will work, or the effect it will have in changing the internal police and mode of distributing justice at present subsisting in the respective states, without a thorough investigation ...

  • Federalist 9

     |  Rethinking Union and Government

    Federalist 9 Federalist 9 1 Alexander Hamilton If too powerful, the central government would be tyrannical. If not strong enough, the Union would not hold together. In pointing out these problems, Publius argues that a solution has been found through a "great improvement" in the "science of politics." November 21, 1787 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of ...

  • Federalist 15

     |  Rethinking Union and Government

    Federalist 15 Federalist 15 1 Alexander Hamilton Echoing earlier critiques of the Articles of Confederation, Publius disputes the notion that the national government must be weak in order for liberty to be secured. December 1, 1787 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union In the course of the preceding papers I have endeavored, my fellow-citizens, to place before you in a clear and convincing light the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together to be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In ...

  • Federalist 71

     |  Three Branches of Government

    Federalist 71 Federalist 71 1 Alexander Hamilton Publius continues his defense of the presidency under the Constitution. March 18, 1788 The Duration in Office of the Executive Duration in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to the energy of the executive authority. This has relation to two objects: to the personal firmness of the executive magistrate in the employment of his constitutional powers, and to the stability of the system of administration which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the first, it must be evident that the longer the duration in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining so important an advantage. It is a general principle of human nature that a man will be interested ...

  • Federalist 72

     |  Three Branches of Government

    Federalist 72 Federalist 72 1 Alexander Hamilton Anti-Federalists argued that an executive without term limits could, through demagoguery, keep office for as long as he could manipulate the public. Publius counters that re-eligibility will encourage good behavior. Subsequently, the Twenty-Second Amendment, enacted in 1951, limited the presidency to two terms. March 21, 1788 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-eligibility of the Executive Considered The administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual and perhaps its most precise signification, it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province ...

  • Federalist 73

     |  Three Branches of Government

    Federalist 73 Federalist 73 1 Alexander Hamilton Although all legislation originates in Congress, the executive plays an integral role through the veto power. March 21, 1788 The Provision for the Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power The third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive authority is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident that without proper attention to this article, the separation of the executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him. They might, in most cases, either reduce ...

  • Federalist 78

     |  Three Branches of Government

    Federalist 78 Federalist 78 1 Alexander Hamilton Defending the idea of judicial review—the authority of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional—Publius denies that it leads to judicial supremacy. The courts must never substitute "will" for "judgment," as all branches of government answer to the Constitution. June 14, 1788 The Judiciary Department We proceed now to an examination of the judiciary department of the proposed government. In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which ...

  • An Election Sermon

     |  Natural Rights/American Revolution

    An Election Sermon An Election Sermon 1 Gad Hitchcock (1718-1803) Pastors and ministers were among the highest educated citizens in the American colonies, and often addressed politics from the pulpit. This sermon by Hitchcock was delivered on election day in 1774, in the presence of General Thomas Gage, the British military governor of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. It decries British monarchical rule and celebrates the idea of the consent of the governed, appealing to reason as well as revelation. 1774 ...In a mixed government, such as the British, public virtue and religion, in the several branches, though they may not be exactly of a mind in every measure, will be the security of order and tranquility—Corruption and venality, the certain ...

  • Query XIII: Constitution

     |  Articles of Confederation

    Query XIII: Constitution Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XIII: Constitution 1 Thomas Jefferson Virginia, the most populous state, adopted its state constitution in 1776, a month before the Declaration of Independence passed Congress. Jefferson, Virginia's governor from 1779 to 1781, addressed the problems that plagued the state's first attempt at self-government in his 1784 book, Notes on the State of Virginia. 1784 The Constitution of the State and its Several Charters ...This constitution was formed when we were new and unexperienced in the science of government. It was the first, too, which was formed in the whole United States. No wonder then that time and trial have discovered very capital defects in it. 1. The majority of the men in the ...

  • Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments

     |  Religion, Morality, and Property

    Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments 1 James Madison (1751-1836) Madison circulated the Memorial and Remonstrance anonymously in 1785 as part of the effort to pass the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. It appeals to Christian citizens by emphasizing that Christianity's own teachings preclude politically coerced support for particular sects, and to all citizens based on reason. June 20, 1785 To the Honorable the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia: A Memorial and Remonstrance We the subscribers, citizens of the said Commonwealth, having taken into serious consideration, a Bill printed by order of the last Session of General Assembly, entitled "A ...

  • Vices of the Political System of the United States

     |  Articles of Confederation

    Vices of the Political System of the United States Vices of the Political System of the United States 1 James Madison In this essay, Madison outlines the main issues that the Constitutional Convention should address. His early arrival in Philadelphia allowed him to incorporate his ideas into a recommended plan for the Convention—what came to be called the Virginia Plan—representing no mere revision of the Articles of Confederation, but the adoption of an entirely new Constitution. April 1787 1. Failure of the States to comply with the Constitutional requisitions. This evil has been so fully experienced both during the war and since the peace, results so naturally from the number and independent authority of the States and has been so uniformly ...

  • Federalist 10

     |  Rethinking Union and Government

    Federalist 10 Federalist 10 1 James Madison Whereas democracy entails direct rule of the people, in a republic the people rule indirectly, through their representatives. A republic can therefore encompass a greater population and geographical area. This difference is decisive in the American experiment, Publius argues, for an expansive republic is able to control the inherent danger of majority faction. November 22, 1787 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their ...

  • Federalist 40

     |  Rethinking Union and Government

    Federalist 40 Federalist 40 1 James Madison In creating the Constitution, the Constitutional Convention overstepped its mandate, which was to amend the Articles of Confederation. Publius cannot dispute this. Instead, he appeals to the principles of the Declaration of Independence to support the Convention's work. January 18, 1788 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained The second point to be examined is whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution. The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference either to the ...

  • Federalist 47

     |  Rethinking Union and Government

    Federalist 47 Federalist 47 1 James Madison Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution violated the maxim of the French political philosopher Montesquieu that the three branches of government should be "separate and distinct" in order to guard against tyranny. Using Montesquieu's own examples and the examples of American state constitutions, Publius refutes the idea that partial overlap of the branches is dangerous to liberty. January 30, 1788 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among its Different Parts Having reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution ...

  • Federalist 48

     |  Rethinking Union and Government

    Federalist 48 Federalist 48 1 James Madison Taking the argument of the previous paper one step further, Publius argues that overlapping branches are essential to the maintenance of separation of powers. Unless each branch possesses "practical security" against the other two, departmental boundaries will be mere "parchment barriers" and the legislative branch will likely absorb all power to itself. February 1, 1788 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other It was shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next ...

  • Federalist 49

     |  Rethinking Union and Government

    Federalist 49 Federalist 49 1 James Madison Thomas Jefferson proposed a direct appeal to the people as a method of solving constitutional disputes among the branches. Publius argues that in addition to being dangerous, such a system would inherently favor the legislative branch. What is more, such appeals would give the impression that the Constitution is defective, thus depriving it of veneration. February 2, 1788 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention The author of the Notes on the State of Virginia, quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention ...

  • Federalist 51

     |  Rethinking Union and Government

    Federalist 51 Federalist 51 1 James Madison Publius argues that the Constitution will maintain separation of powers by means of its "interior structure." The "great security" against tyranny is to give the members of each department the "necessary constitutional means" combined with the requisite "personal motives" to resist encroachments on their power. The fact "that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government" is a "reflection on human nature." February 6, 1788 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments as ...

  • Federalist 52

     |  Three Branches of Government

    Federalist 52 Federalist 52 1 James Madison The House of Representatives is designed, Publius explains, to be closest to the people. February 8, 1788 The House of Representatives From the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent ...

  • Federalist 53

     |  Three Branches of Government

    Federalist 53 Federalist 53 1 James Madison Publius often returns to the problem posed by majority tyranny. Here he expresses his preference for biennial over annual elections. February 9, 1788 The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives I shall here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true that when once established they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself ...
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